In the United States, voters directly elect dozens of politicians: Presidents, governors, legislators, mayors, and so on. How do voters decide which politician to blame for which policy outcomes? Previous research on gubernatorial approval has suggested that voters divide policy blame between governors and the president based on each office's "functional responsibilities"-requiring that responsibilities are clearcut, which is seldom true. Using data from four surveys, I show that voters actually divide responsibility for economic conditions in a partisan manner, preferring to blame officials from the opposing party when problems arise. However, this sort of argument fails to account for the powerful and well-documented role that partisanship plays in structuring American voters' behavior. My argument, detailed below, is that Americans rely heavily on partisan shortcuts when deciding whether to hold their governor (as opposed to the president) responsible for state-level policy outcomes-especially when functional responsibility for a particular policy area is shared by both the governor and the president. Of course, it's far from novel to suggest that partisanship matters in American politics; previous research has shown abundantly that voters tend to have more patience with politicians of their own party than with politicians from the other side. My major claim is not just that partisanship matters, then, but rather that partisanship helps determine which policy results get attributed to the governor and which get attributed to the president. Previous work on gubernatorial elections has erred by emphasizing functional responsibility without also taking account of partisanship.
However, this sort of argument fails to account for the powerful and well-documented role that partisanship plays in structuring American voters' behavior. My argument, detailed below, is that Americans rely heavily on partisan shortcuts when deciding whether to hold their governor (as opposed to the president) responsible for state-level policy outcomes-especially when functional responsibility for a particular policy area is shared by both the governor and the president. Of course, it's far from novel to suggest that partisanship matters in American politics; previous research has shown abundantly that voters tend to have more patience with politicians of their own party than with politicians from the other side. My major claim is not just that partisanship matters, then, but rather that partisanship helps determine which policy results get attributed to the governor and which get attributed to the president. Previous work on gubernatorial elections has erred by emphasizing functional responsibility without also taking account of partisanship.
To be clear, I do not intend to argue that voters will completely ignore the president's and governor's actual functional responsibilities; even the least engaged citizen should know that governors have as little control over foreign policy as presidents have over potholes. Rather, my argument is that partisan considerations will influence allocations of blame in the many policy areas where the president and the governor share responsibility-an argument I test by analyzing responsibility for the state's economy. When the president and the governor belong to the same party, there is not much opportunity for a partisan blame game to develop between them. But when they belong to different parties, a situation I refer to as "divided federalism," partisan voters gain the opportunity to blame one for economic problems while giving the other a free pass. Just as divided government creates a potential blame game between the president and Congress, divided federalism creates a similar situation between the president and the governors.
I proceed now by briefly reviewing the two main literatures I draw on-the literatures on partisan bias and on gubernatorial elections-and show how the latter can benefit by incorporating insights from the former. I then explore three specific empirical implications of this theoretical argument.
A Theory of Partisan Bias and Divided Federalism
Studies of partisan bias began decades ago with the psychological model introduced in
The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) ; an updated take on this argument is that voters simply reject information that challenges their prior beliefs (Zaller 1992) , or that they choose to give greater credibility to information from sources they trust (Lupia and McCubbins 1998; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987) , even if those sources are potentially biased.
Regardless of which of these mechanisms produces partisan bias, we have evidence that the biases exist. First, we have evidence that partisanship colors voter evaluations of policy outcomes: Conover, Feldman, and Knight have provided detailed evidence that retrospective (1986) and prospective (1987) economic evaluations strongly reflect respondents' political views, arguing that these evaluations "become extensions of partisan evaluations of the president's capabilities" (1987, 578 ; see also Bartels 2002) . A similar story arises with regard to consumer confidence surveys; although actual economic conditions have a strong impact on consumer confidence, political evaluations also play a significant role (DeBoef and Kellstedt 2004) . In addition, we have evidence that partisan factors influence whether voters will consider economic conditions when voting in Congressional elections (Fiorina 1983; Hibbing and Alford 1981) .
These findings have come from research primarily concerned with the national setting; these insights have not been fully applied to the subnational context. In fact, the second literature I draw on-the literature on gubernatorial approval and elections-has largely overlooked these results. Instead, most research in this second literature has debated whether voters hold governors accountable for local (i.e. state-level) conditions or whether governors are entirely at the mercy of the president's coattails. Few dispute that national partisan trends and national economic conditions influence gubernatorial approval and elections; the question has been whether local conditions, typically operationalized with state economic indicators, also matter.
The answer to this latter question has remained elusive. Table 1 summarizes the results of several influential studies; the inconsistency is striking. Some studies have found that state economic variables affect gubernatorial approval (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Jacobson 2006; Niemi et al. 1995) ; others have found that they do not (Crew and Weiher 1996; Peltzman 1987);  and still others have found the effect to be contingent on some other factor (Ebeid and Rodden 2006; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Stein 1990 ). These inconsistencies may arise from a widespread but implicit assumption that if local conditions matter, all voters will objectively take equal account (or non-account) of them when evaluating the governor-an assumption at serious odds with the work on partisanship and bias referenced above.
[ Table 1 about here] Those arguing that only national conditions affect gubernatorial popularity imply, in effect, that voters blame the president for every policy outcome, at any level, and evaluate all subnational politicians based solely on the president's performance.
1 Those arguing that local conditions also matter imply that voters have some standard by which to assign responsibility for some policies to the governor even while assigning responsibility for other policies to the president. As noted earlier, the major argument at present is that voters assign blame based on the president's and governor's actual responsibilities: Voters perceive objective differences between the duties of presidents and governors and vote accordingly. This explanation omits partisan bias entirely, predicting instead that all voters will attribute responsibility for the same issues to the same officials.
My argument modifies this functional responsibility hypothesis by introducing insights from the literature on partisanship and bias. I do not attempt to displace the functional responsibility claims entirely; when gubernatorial and presidential responsibilities are clearly delineated, we may well observe voter behaviors roughly consistent with the functional responsibility argument. But when responsibilities are unclear, as is often the case, the functional responsibility mechanism cannot logically operate. In this situation, I expect the literature on partisanship and bias to become relevant. Rudolph (2003) has already shown that partisan considerations affect whether a voter will blame Congress or the president for national economic problems. My central claim is that American federalism creates a similar blame game between governors and the president: Voters will tend to blame whichever level of government that is not controlled by their own party.
Recently, Malhotra and Kuo (2008) Stein (1990) York, and Nevada did more respondents blame their governor than blamed Ronald Reagan.
Partisanship and Blame
[ Table 2 about here]
By contrast, Reagan nor the governor was to blame, or perhaps that there were no problems to blame on anybody-a pattern that may reflect some weaknesses with the survey question.
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[ Table 3 about here]
Once we take account of respondent partisanship in this manner, respondents with 
Partisanship and Economic Evaluations
The 2006 gubernatorial elections took place in a similar context as the 1982 elections:
The economy was generally weak, and the president was a Republican. An advantage of this composite measure is that it has a correct answer that respondents should have given, regardless of personal political beliefs: Either the state economy was stronger than the national economy or it was not. In a world of objective, informed citizens, raw economic indicators would predict most (or all) of the variance in this measure. Such objectivity seems to be assumed in three of the most widely read studies dealing with gubernatorial approval-that is, Atkeson and Partin (1995) , Carsey and Wright (1998) , and Stein (1990) . In these three studies, the authors attempt to learn whether governors are held accountable for statelevel economic conditions; in all three studies, the authors measure state economic conditions using respondent evaluations of the state economy rather than using raw macroeconomic indicators. This method is not problematic as long as respondent evaluations actually measure the true pulse of the state's economy-a proposition that the theoretical arguments presented above should lead us to question. By contrast, if partisan biases influence respondent economic evaluations, then regressing gubernatorial approval on economic evaluations as these three studies do might not be much different from regressing gubernatorial approval on itself. [ More broadly, the general finding in this table is that respondent partisanship produces stronger perceptual biases under divided federalism than elsewhere. Where the governor and the president belonged to different parties, partisanship had a strong effect on respondent evaluations of the state's economy relative to the nation's; where the governor and the president belonged to the same party, partisanship had almost no effect. 7 These patterns are consistent with those reported in the previous section.
Gubernatorial Approval and Economic Conditions
I now turn to the gubernatorial approval literature's major debate: Whether voters hold governors responsible for state-level economic conditions. As summarized in Table 1 [ Table 5 about here] [ Table 6 about here]
The estimated effects of state unemployment rates on gubernatorial approval are the coefficients of greatest theoretical interest. Again, partisan differences are strong under divided federalism but weak and insignificant elsewhere. Because SurveyUSA releases only aggregate approval data, I cannot run the same interactive models as in Table 5 , nor can I include the same demographic controls. Nevertheless, the partisan differences are apparent. As in Table 5 , where the governor was a Democrat, Republicans held their governors accountable for high unemployment but Democrats did not; elsewhere, there was not a significant partisan pattern.
We can observe the same pattern yet again in a replication of Carsey and Wright's (1998) model of the effects of state economic evaluations on gubernatorial voting. The first column in Table 7 reprints their final logit estimates of the effect of respondent evaluations of the state economy on the probability of voting for the incumbent gubernatorial candidate. Although their analysis (and my replication) contains several additional variables, I display only one coefficient from each logit model-the estimated marginal effect of respondent economic evaluations.
When I estimate these regressions separately by respondent party in the latter two columns of the table, the importance of divided federalism again becomes apparent. Table 7 tells the same story
as Tables 5 and 6 : In states with divided federalism, the estimated effect of state economic conditions on gubernatorial voting was more than three times as strong among the president's copartisans as among the governor's. In states without divided federalism, there was no meaningful partisan difference.
[ Table 7 about here]
This interactive finding in Tables 5, 6 , and 7 might seem odd if not for the other results discussed earlier in this paper. Recall that under divided federalism, respondents can choose to blame either their governor or the president for high unemployment. As Table 3 shows, members of the president's party living under divided federalism are the group that is most likely to choose to blame the governor for state-level economic problems. And as Table 4 shows, this is the same group of respondents that is likely to sharply adjust its state economic evaluations downward when confronted with poor economic performance. In light of these two earlier findings, it is hardly surprising that this same group of respondents also takes strongest account of poor economic conditions when evaluating their governors.
Discussion
The preceding analysis leads to three major conclusions. First, partisanship has a strong influence on how voters assign responsibility for policy outcomes. When functional responsibilities are shared among officials from opposing parties, voters assign blame in a partisan manner; they do not assign blame objectively based only on each official's job description. Second, partisanship also influences how voters perceive policy performance by various levels of government. When the president and the governor belong to opposing parties, voters will overestimate the policy success of whichever level of government that is controlled by their preferred party. And third, partisanship influences whether voters will hold the governor accountable for the state economy. The effect of state economics on gubernatorial approval varies among partisan subgroups-but only when the president and the governor belong to different parties. This latter conclusion follows logically from the first two. When it suits their partisan predispositions, voters blame their governor for state-level problems;
when it does not, they do not.
In addition, this partisan logic also affects voter judgments of policy outcomes. Partisan biases have clear, meaningful effects on respondent evaluations of the state's economic health. A handful of well-regarded studies have used correlations between retrospective economic evaluations and gubernatorial approval to argue that voters do, in fact, hold governors responsible for the state's economy Partin 1995, 1998; Carsey and Wright 1998; Stein 1990 ). But given that retrospective evaluations are strongly influenced by respondent partisanship, political scientists should hesitate to use retrospective economic evaluations as indicators of actual economic performance.
Notes
1 This may read as a straw man, but it is frequently implied in the gubernatorial elections literature. Peltzman's words provide one example: "[Americans] vote as if they understand that national rather than local policies have the dominant effect on their income" (1987, 296).
2 Atkeson and Partin (1995) assign all economic responsibility to governors; Carsey and Wright (1998) argue that presidents bear national economic responsibility while governors are responsible only for the state's economic health relative to the nation's.
3 The poll asked, "Who's more to blame for economic problems in (respondent's state):
President Reagan, Governor (name), both, or neither?" Perhaps some who said "neither" thought there were no economic problems-or at least, they did not want to admit that Republican leaders had failed them. Or perhaps they thought that economic problems arose independently of government policies. The latter explanation would be consistent with Rudolph's (2003) work, which shows that economically conservative respondents will blame labor or business leaders for economic conditions, given the opportunity to do so, regardless of partisan considerationsalthough economic conservatism does tend to correlate with Republicanism. 5 Because respondents have only five options when evaluating either the state or national economy, it is possible that an extremely optimistic respondent could give the highest score to the nation but find herself unable to give an even higher score to the state. To verify that this potentiality did not skew any of the results below, I repeated all these analyses omitting the 4,474 respondents who gave the best (or worst) possible evaluation both to their state and to the nation; the substantive conclusions were the same.
6 Unemployment rates have a st. dev. of 1.04; these economic evaluations have a st. dev. of 1.03.
As such, these marginal coefficients are roughly equivalent to standardized coefficients.
7 Note that this does not mean that there are no partisan biases in states governed by the president's party, only that there is no bias toward (or against) the state as opposed to the nation. 8 Respondents choosing the "not sure" option are omitted from this analysis, since "not sure" can mean either "I don't know" or "neutral." The variable is coded from 1 through 4.
9 Careful readers might object to my use of unemployment by reference to the "issue ownership"
literature, pointing out that Democrats own the issue of unemployment (Petrocik 1992 12 This decision was arbitrary but not consequential; when using data from other periods in the 
